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DETERMINING THE LIMITS OF POSTPETITION
INTEREST UNDER SECTION 506(b) OF THE




The passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 marked a sig-
nificant event in Congressional legislation as it provided our legal system
with the most comprehensive body of bankruptcy law since the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.2 However, as is characteristic of law in
general, the shortcomings and imperfections of the Code quickly became
apparent, resulting in several major amendments and revisions. The first
set of revisions was introduced through the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,' which was enacted in response to a Su-
preme Court holding that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under
the Code was unconstitutional." In addition to the jurisdiction and venue
questions that the 1984 Amendments sought to resolve, these amendments
also included substantive changes to the Code.5 In 1986, another set of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America;
B.A., Wells College (1977); J.D., Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America
(1980).
' Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). (Hereinafter referred to as the "Code").
2 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
' Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). (Hereinafter referred to as "1984 Amendments").-
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that the grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges to decide state-based claims
arising in or related to cases under the Code was a grant of judicial power that could only be exer-
cised by an Article III court. Because the bankruptcy courts were not Article III courts, the jurisdic-
tion granted under Section 1471 of the Code was in violation of the Constitution. After considerable
delay, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, supra at note 3, was enacted
to respond to this question. Under the 1984 Amendments, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
bankruptcy cases is vested in the Federal district courts, which are empowered to refer any or all
bankruptcy cases or proceedings arising in or related to a bankruptcy case to the bankruptcy courts in
that district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
" These changes were proposed under Title III of the 1984 Amendments and addressed a variety
of issues under the Code, including consumer credit agreements, grain storage facility bankruptcies,
leasehold management agreements, the nondischargability of judgments against drunk drivers, and
collective bargaining agreements.
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amendments was enacted to address the United States Trustee System
under the Code, and to make special provisions for family farmer bank-
ruptcies through the addition of Chapter 12.6
This barrage of change, clarification and the making of a more per-
fect body of bankruptcy law continues. As with the question of the consti-
tutionality of the bankruptcy courts in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,7 the need for clarification of the Code
often finds its way to the Supreme Court. This process of legal clarifica-
tion and resolution has been activated most recently in the Court's grant-
ing of certiorari in the case of In re Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. (hereinaf-
ter Ron Pair Enterprises)." In this case, the Court will interpret the
meaning of Section 506(b) of the Code.' The language of Section 506(b) is
as follows:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this Section, is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder
of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.10
In Ron Pair Enterprises, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the allowance of postpetition interest to oversecured creditors under
Section 506(b) was limited to consensual liens, such that it did not permit
postpetition interest on claims secured by nonconsensual liens such as tax
liens."1 This is contrary to the Fourth Circuit's holding in In re Best Re-
pair Company, Inc. (hereinafter Best Repair),"2 which held that "Section
506(b) permits an over-secured creditor to recover post-petition interest on
nonconsensual claims."1 8 The majority of the courts that have interpreted
Section 506(b) have held that it allows postpetition interest on all over-
' Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
7 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
3 828 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub. nom., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., U.S____, 108 S. Ct. 1218, 56 U.S.L.W. 3647 (No. 87-1043). A petition of certiorari was
recently filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requesting the Court to consider the same
question as the one presented in Ron Pair Enterprises. Massachusetts v. Gray, petition for cert. filed,
56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (April 28, 1988)(No. 87-1784).
9 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20 Id.
11 828 F.2d at 372-73.
11 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1986).
13 Id. at 1082.
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secured claims, whether they are consensual or nonconsensual in nature."'
This interpretation is based on what these courts see as a reading of the
"plain language" of the statute. The courts in the minority have held that
postpetition interest under Section 506(b) is limited to consensual liens.15
These courts have taken this position because they believe that the lan-
guage of Section 506(b) is too ambiguous. Because of this "ambiguity"
and the lack of any legislative history on the question of postpetition inter-
est under the provision,16 these courts have looked to the pre-Code law on
postpetition interest to support the view that it was the intent of Congress
to codify the "well established" pre-Code law, which permitted postpeti-
tion interest only where the claim was over-secured due to a consensual
lien."7
This article will consider the merits of both sides of the debate that
now engulfs Section 506(b), as presented primarily by the Sixth and
Fourth Circuit Courts in Ron Pair Enterprises and Best Repair, respec-
14 In re Busone, 71 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Brandenburg, 71 Bankr. 719
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987); In re Russo, 63 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); In re Charter Co., 63
Bankr. 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Maldonado, 62 Bankr. 594 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (The
claimant in this case held a mortgage that did not provide for interest; the court cited Best Repair as
support for interpreting Section 506(b) to allow postpetition interest even if the agreement under
which the claim arose does not provide for interest); In re Gilliland, 67 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Tex
1986); In re Young, 61 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986); In re Henzler Mfg. Co., 55 Bankr. 194
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Romano, 51 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Morrissey,
37 Bankr. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co., Inc., 36 Bankr. 159
(Bankr. D. Utah 1983); In re Hoffman, 28 Bankr. 503 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983); In re Bormes, 14
Bankr. 895 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); In re Busman, 5 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
" In re Newbury Cafe, Inc., 841 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1988); Massachusetts v. Gray, petition for
cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (April 28, 1988)(No. 87-1784); In re Nevada Environmental Landfill,
81 Bankr. 55 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); In re Dan-Ver Enterprises, Inc., 67 Bankr. 951 (W.D. Pa.
1986); In re Churchfield, 62 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Granite Lumber Co., 63
Bankr. 466 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986); In re Venable, 48 Bankr. 853, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re
Trent, 42 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 Bankr. 151
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
1" The legislative history concerning Section 506(b) does not make any statement regarding
postpetition interest; it only addresses the allowance of "fees, costs and charges":
Subsection (b) codifies current law by entitling a creditor with an over-secured claim to any
reasonable fees (including attorney's fees), costs, or charges provided under the agreement
under which the claim arose. These fees, costs, and charges are [sic] secured claims to the
extent that the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the underlying claim.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, 5854.
See also H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 356-57, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6312. The same statement is made in the House report with the exception of
the parenthetical statement (including attorney's fees).
17 The pre-Code rule on postpetition interest and its judicial history is discussed infra at notes
43-83 and accompanying text.
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tively. After summarizing the arguments presented and the decision of the
court in Ron Pair Enterprises, the article will present an analysis of the
majority and minority views on the language of Section 506(b) and offer a
critical assessment of the pre-Code law on the allowance of postpetition
interest on over-secured claims. From this assessment, this article will
conclude that Section 506(b) should be interpreted in accordance with the
majority view of permitting postpetition interest on all over-secured
claims, regardless of the consensual or nonconsensual nature of the lien.
In support of this conclusion, the article will show that the language of
Section 506(b) is not so ambiguous as to permit a contrary reading, and
that to conclude otherwise, as the minority would urge, would serve to
continue a strained and artificial reading of the provision. This conclusion
will also be based on an analysis and assessment of the judicial evolution
and logic put forth in support of the pre-Code law of limiting postpetition
interest to consensual liens. This support of pre-Code law is found to be
flawed and questionable as a "well established" rule of bankruptcy law."
I. THE CASE: In re Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.
The secured claimant in Ron Pair Enterprises was the United States
government, which filed a claim against the estate of the debtor for unpaid
withholding and social security taxes, prepetition penalties, and prepeti-
tion and postpetition interest against the unpaid taxes.1 9 The Government
1" In its consideration of pre-Code law on postpetition interest, the court in Ron Pair Enter-
prises correctly describes the general rule prohibiting postpetition interest and the first two exceptions
to this prohibition as "well established" rules of law. It also stated that, "It was equally well estab-
lished by at least four courts of appeals that the third exception - allowing the payment of postpetition
interest if the claim was over-secured - did not apply to liens which were nonconsensual in nature,
such as tax liens. . . ." 828 F.2d at 371 (citations omitted). The court asserted that Congress did not
intend to "depart" from the pre-Code rule permitting postpetition interest on over-secured consensual
liens, and that Section 506(b) codifies this pre-Code rule. Id. at 373.
The court in In re Gilliland, 67 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986), aptly described the logic
behind the third exception to the pre-Code prohibition against post-petition interest "to be flawed."
This article will analyze the logic of the third exception, and question the description of this exception
as being a pre-Code rule that was as "well established" as the general prohibition against postpetition
interest and the first two exceptions to this prohibition. It will also challenge the suggestion that
Congress intended to codify the third exception under Section 506(b).
" The debtor, Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., filed a petition for a Chapter 11 reorganization under
the Code. The reorganization plan provided that the Government would receive payment of prepeti-
tion taxes, penalties and interest, but no provision was made for postpetition interest on the outstand-
ing tax debt. The bankruptcy court rejected the Government's objection to the reorganization plan and
was subsequently reversed by the district court, which held that the Government was entitled to
postpetition interest. 828 F.2d at 368-69. The district court held that the "plain language" of Section
506(b) entitled the Government to postpetition interest. It relied on Best Repair and a prior Sixth
[Vol. 5
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held a prepetition tax lien against the debtor's property to secure the
debtor's payment of his tax obligations. In this casg, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision which allowed the
Government postpetition interest under Section 506(b), holding that "the
language of Section 506(b) does not clearly provide for the payment of
such interest and, in fact, it fails to explicitly overrule the pre-Code judi-
cially created concept disallowing the payment of postpetition interest on
nonconsensual prepetition oversecured claims."2
Thus, the debate regarding the meaning of Section 506(b) hinged on
the language of the provision and the pre-Code judicial law on the ques-
tion of the permissibility of postpetition interest. The debtor argued that
postpetition interest under Section 506(b) was limited to consensual liens,
such as mortgages, where a contractual agreement had been executed be-
tween the debtor and the creditor providing specific terms for the payment
of interest, costs and fees that would be allowed under the loan agreement.
This argument was based on the debtor's reading of the language of Sec-
tion 506(b) in such a way that the clause "charges provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose" modified the words "interest on
such claim" as well as "any reasonable fees, costs, or charges."2 The
debtor also noted that this reading of the statute was consistent with the
pre-Code law regarding postpetition interest and was a correct reading,
because the legislative history of Section 506(b) did not indicate that the
provision was to be a departure from pre-Code law and the language of
the statute was "too ambiguous to be considered an explicit departure
from a well-established doctrine."22
On the other hand, the Government argued that Section 506(b) was
not ambiguous, and it read the allowance of postpetition interest on over-
secured liens to include all liens, regardless of the consensual or noncon-
sensual nature of the lien. It suggested that the clause "charges provided
for under the agreement under which such claim arose" only modified
"any reasonable fees, costs, or charges" and that it did not include "inter-
est on such claim" because it had been separated by the commas and offset
from the other words by "and any," thus indicating that Congress in-
tended for the interest on claims to be treated differently from "fees, costs,
Circuit decision, In re Colegrove, 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985), in which the court looked to Section
506(b) as authority for its conclusion that a mortgagee was entitled to interest on arrearages even
though interest was not provided for in the loan agreement. 828 F.2d at 369.
20 828 F.2d at 368.
21 Id. at 369.
22 Id.
19881
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or charges". In other words, "fees, costs, or charges" would only be per-
mitted under Section 506(b) if there was an agreement between the debtor
and the creditor providing for such claims; whereas, interest on claims
would be allowed in any case pursuant to agreement or otherwise. The
Government argued that since the language of the statute was unambigu-
ous, the court should not refer to the pre-Code rule concerning postpeti-
tion interest.23
In rejecting the Government's suggestion that the pre-Code law not
be considered in interpreting Section 506(b), the court explained that,
while the language of the statute is the starting point in statutory inter-
pretation, pre-Code law also needs to be considered in order to understand
the context in which the statute was drafted, and thus its meaning.24 The
court described the pre-Code rule as "a well-established general rule that
interest on both secured and unsecured prepetition claims ceased to accrue
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition."25 The court noted that this
principle was based on an equitable doctrine that delays in the payment of
the claims of creditors, which are necessitated by the bankruptcy process,
should not place one creditor (that is, a creditor with high interest bearing
obligations) at an advantage over other creditors where the assets of the
estate are already insufficient to pay the principal all of the estate's out-
23
The Government counters by arguing that the language of Section 506(b) is unambiguous
in that the emphasized clause above [provided for under the agreement under which such
claim arose] only modifies 'any reasonable fees, costs, or charges.' The Government relics
on the fact that the phrase 'interest on such claim' is set off by commas and is followed by
the words 'and any,' indicating that interest is to be treated differently from fees, costs, or
charges. The Government argues that since the language is unambiguous and allows for
postpetition interest to be awarded on any allowed secured prepetition claim regardless of
whether it is consensual or not, this Court should not refer to pre-Code law to interpret
Section 506(b). The Government suggests further that even if this Court is inclined to
review pre-Code law, the punctuation, phraseology and grammatical structure of Section
506(b) plainly and unambiguously express Congress' intent to depart from pre-Code law.
828 F.2d at 369.
24
We first reject the Government's contention that pre-Code law should not be relied on in
interpreting Section 506(b) since the provision appears to be unambiguous. While the lan-
guage of a statute is always the starting point when its construction is at issue, it is only the
starting point. [Pire-Code law should be reviewed in order to better understand the context
in which the provision was drafted and therefore the language itself. In fact, [t]he normal
rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the inter-
pretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has fol-
lowed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codification.
828 F.2d at 369-370 (citations omitted) (Emphasis added).
25 828 F.2d at 370.
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standing debts.2"
The court proceeded with a discussion of the three exceptions to this
general prohibition to postpetition interest. The first exception allows
postpetition interest in cases where the debtor is proved to be solvent. The
second exception allows postpetition interest in cases where the secured
creditor is in possession of securities or other property that produces in-
come during the bankruptcy proceedings. The last exception, which the
court relied on in this case, allows postpetition interest in cases where the
value of the collateral securing the claim is sufficient to pay both the prin-
cipal and interest on the debt. 7
The third exception has been interpreted by five circuit courts to be
limited to consensual liens for several reasons: (1) because the security
agreement in granting the lien has been voluntarily entered into by the
creditor and the debtor and the creditor has bargained for the collateral to
secure the principal and interest on the debt, this expectation should not
be interfered with; (2) nonconsensual liens such as tax liens are general
liens which apply to all of the debtor's property and are not specific liens
like consensual liens; and (3) the interest accruing on unpaid taxes is more
of an enforcement device against debtors, but works as a penalty on the
other creditors of the debtor who will go unpaid as the accruing interest
depletes the availability of assets for their claims.2" On the basis of this
interpretation of the third exception to the pre-Code law and its reading
of Section 506(b), the court in Ron Pair Enterprises held that Section
506(b) was not intended to change this exception to the pre-Code prohibi-
tion against postpetition interest, and thus the Government was not enti-
tled to such interest.29
II. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 506(b)
As noted above, the court in Ron Pair Enterprises approached its
analysis of Section 506(b) by "starting" with the language of the statute.30
The discussion and analysis of the language of Section 506(b) in Ron
Pair Enterprises is rather limited and fails to bring any new dimension to
26 Id.
27 Id.
2' See In re Boston & Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Kerber Packing Com-
pany, 276 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1959).
29 828 F.2d at 373.
"0 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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the arguments that the lower courts supporting its view have offered pre-
viously."1 The court essentially looked to Collier on Bankruptcy 2 for sup-
port, which is also of the view that Section 506(b) limits the allowance of
postpetition interest to over-secured consensual liens in accordance with
the pre-Code rule. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy notes that there is a clear split
in authority on the interpretation of Section 506(b), and states that this
limited view of the provision is "consistent with the position that the
phrase 'provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose'
in 11 U.S.C. Section 506(b) modifies the phrase 'interest on such
claim.' "' However, Collier on Bankruptcy also acknowledges that when
one considers Section 506(b) from a grammatical perspective, a logical
reading of the statute does allow for postpetition interest on all liens,
without any distinction as to whether the lien is consensual or
nonconsensual.3 5
The court in Ron Pair Enterprises concluded that it did not agree
with the opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court in Best Repair that the
"'plain meaning' of Section 506(b) allows for the payment of postpetition
interest on all allowed over-secured claims, including nonconsensual
11 See In re Newbury Cafe, 80 Bankr. 259 (D. Mass. 1987), affg 72 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. E.D.
Mass. 1987); In re Dan-Ver Enterprises, Inc., 67 Bankr. 951 (W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Churchfield, 62
Bankr. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Granite Lumber, 63 Bankr. 466 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1986); In re Venable, 48 Bankr. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 Bankr.
151 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). Most of these cases found the language of Section 506(b) was too
ambiguous. This assertion of ambiguity and the lack of legislative history on the question of postpeti-
tion interest was advanced by these courts to support their conclusion that Congress intended to codify
the pre-Code rule limiting postpetition interest to over-secured consensual liens under Section 506(b).
32 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY S 506.05 (15th ed. 1987).
13 "COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY concludes that interpreting Section 506(b) as disallowing postpe-
tition interest is more in line with pre-Code precedents and is
consistent with the position that the phrase 'provided for under the agreement under which
such claim arose' in 11 U.S.C. Section 506(b) modifies the phrase 'interest on such claim'
which . . . is the preferred position. Further, this commentator notes that the legislative
history does not evidence an intent to change the pre-Code rule.
828 F.2d at 372 (citations omitted).
1 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 506.05 at 506-41-42, n.5b (15th ed. 1987).
35
Inasmuch as this grammatical ambiguity was present in all prior versions of 11 U.S.C. §
506(b) starting with H.R. 6, it cannot be explained as a desire on the part of the drafters
to divorce interest from the "reasonable" qualifier which appears only in later versions.
But see In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co., which, based on the assumption that 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) allows postpetition interest on nonconsensual lien claims, explains the
grammatical structure as necessary to provide for situations in which there is no agreement.
If one accepts that assumption, which constitutes the minority view, that explanation is
logical.
3 CouLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1 506.05 at 506-43, n.10 (15th ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
450 [Vol. 5
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liens," or that the limited reading of Section 506(b) "strains" the plain
meaning of the provision.30 It also stated that the position of the Fourth
Circuit Court is weakened by its "acknowledgment that Section 506(b) is
'not so clear that [it] would not consider its legislative history to aid [its]
interpretation'" and its failure to give a thorough discussion of pre-Code
law.37
Contrary to the views expressed by the court in Ron Pair Enter-
prises, the acknowledgment by the Fourth Circuit Court in Best Repair
that the language of Section 506(b) is "not so clear that it would not
consider its legislative history" is not a weakness in its opinion. It is the
court's recognition of the various arguments about the ambiguity of the
language of Section 506(b), which is the crux of the debate between the
two differing views. Clearly, there is a real question concerning the ambi-
guity of the language of this provision. However, it is the extent and/or
the degree of the ambiguity that causes such a split in authority. The
court in Best Repair, and the vast majority of lower courts that have ad-
dressed this issue, are of the view that the existence of any ambiguity is
not so great as to warrant a reading of the statute other than as it is
written.38 In considering the legislative history of Section 506(b), as op-
posed to the judicial evolution of pre-Code law on postpetition interest,
the court in Best Repair concluded that the legislative history of Section
506(b) did not warrant a "depart[ure] from the natural import of the lan-
guage [of Section 506(b)] itself." 9
When considering the language of the statute, the argument that it is
not ambiguous seems to be most persuasive. First, the provision makes no
distinction between consensual or nonconsensual claims. 40 All references
to claims and secured claims in Section 506(b) are without any such qual-
ification. In addition to this consideration of the "words" of the provision,
the grammatical structure and phrasing of the provision supports the view
that the allowance of interest is not limited to consensual liens. The court
in Best Repair provides a most thorough discussion of the grammatical
structure of Section 506(b):
The phrase "interest on such claim" is set off by commas, and the following
phrase is introduced by "and any". The effect of this usage is to make
36 828 F.2d at 372.
37 Id. at 372-373.
3' See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89 789 F.2d at 1082.
,0 See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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"interest on such claim" a separate and distinct clause to which "provided
for under the agreement" does not apply. If Congress had wanted the
agreement proviso to limit "interest on such claim" to consensual claims, it
could have easily done so by listing seriatim and in parallel form the differ-
ent items an over-secured creditor can recover subject to an agreement.2
Though Congress could have more clearly separated the interest clause
from the agreement clause, we think that the natural meaning of its chosen
words is to permit post-petition interest on nonconsensual over-secured
claims.3
2 ..... Congress could have stated: "there shall be allowed to the holder of
such claim, interest on such claim and reasonable fees, costs, and charges
provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose." Alterna-
tively, the agreement proviso could be placed first: "there shall be allowed
to the holder of such claim, as provided for under the agreement under
which such claim arose, interest on such claim and any reasonable fees,
costs or charges."
3. Thus, Congress might have more clearly stated what we deem already
apparent by adding the following bracketed material: "there shall be al-
lowed to the holder of such claim [i] interest on such claim, and [ii] any
reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for under the agreement under
which such claim arose." Unlike the alterations in footnote two, however,
we think this minor addition comports with the existing meaning of the
provision."'
The kind of analysis presented in Best Repair has been adopted by the
majority of courts in interpreting the plain language of Section 506(b),
and in most of these cases this analysis has concluded the discussion on the
meaning of the provision."2 However, the insistence of courts like Ron
Pair Enterprises to consider pre-Code law on postpetition interest should
not be ignored. Perhaps the most important and compelling reason for
considering the pre-Code law on postpetition interest is that it requires a
review of the judicial evolution of bankruptcy law on the subject, which in
turn provides for a critical analysis of the pre-Code rule that Ron Pair
Enterprises asserted was codified under Section 506(b).
III. THE PRE-CODE RULE: JUDICIAL EVOLUTION AND LOGIC
In addition to the analysis of the language of Section 506(b), the
Sixth Circuit also looked to the pre-Code law on postpetition interest in
41 789 F.2d at 1082.
42 See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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interpreting the provision, which was the fundamental basis of its deci-
sion."3 The court's authority for considering the pre-Code law is found in
a rule of statutory construction set forth in Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection."' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Midlantic to interpret the meaning of the
abandonment provision of Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code."5 As in
Ron Pair Enterprises, there was little legislative history on Section 554
and there had been a pre-Code law on the trustee's powers to abandon
property of the estate at bankruptcy.,6 In its decision to apply this pre-
Code rule in interpreting Section 554, the Court stated:
[W]hen Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on
a trustee's abandonment power. In codifying the judicially developed rule of
abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary
that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of
certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.47
In its description of the pre-Code law regarding postpetition interest,
the court in Ron Pair Enterprises stated that "it was a well-established
general rule that interest on both secured and unsecured prepetition
" "We are of the opinion that the language of Section 506(b), when read in light of the pre-
Code judicially created doctrine, codifies the pre-Code law on the issue of allowable postpetition inter-
est." 828 F.2d at 372.
44 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
45 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4' Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 499 (1986).
47 Id. at 501 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-267
(1979)(emphasis added)). Justice Rehnquist offered a compelling dissenting opinion which questions
the majority's opinion describing the judicially developed pre-Code rules on abandonment as "well
established." In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist also expressed objections to the Court's use
of this pre-Code law to support its interpretation of Section 554(a) because of the "scant" legislative
history of Section 554(a):
The Court seeks to turn the seemingly unqualified language and the absence of helpful
legislative history to its advantage. Adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the
Court argues that in light of Congress' failure to elaborate, Section 554 must have been
intended to codify prior "abandonment" case law, and that under prior law a "trustee
could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws." I
disagree. We have previously expressed our unwillingness to read into unqualified statu-
tory language exceptions or limitations based upon legislative history unless that legisla-
tive history demonstrates with extraordinary clarity that this was indeed the intent of
Congress.
474 U.S. at 510 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
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claims ceased to accrue upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition."4 The
court stated that the federal courts created exceptions to this rule, noting
the third exception which permits postpetition interest where "the value of
the collateral securing the debt is sufficient to pay both the claim and
postpetition interest on the claim."' 49 The court described its view that this
exception was limited to consensual liens as being "equally well estab-
lished by at least four courts of appeals."50
The court's description of its limited view of the third exception as
being the "well established" pre-Code rule that was codified by Congress
under Section 506(b) is debatable and arguably unsupportable. It was a
well established rule in the evolution of the pre-Code law on postpetition
interest that once a debtor had sought relief at bankruptcy or through
receivership, interest would not accrue against the bankrupt's debts.5"
This rule taken from English law was described by Justice Holmes in
Sexton v. Dreyfus:52
For more than a century and a half the theory of the English bankrupt [sic]
system has been that everything stops at a certain date. Interest was not
computed beyond the date of the commission. This rule was applied to
mortgages as well as to unsecured debts ... and notwithstanding occasional
doubts it has been so applied with the prevailing assent of the English
judges ever since .... We take our bankruptcy system from England, and
we naturally assume that the fundamental principles upon which it was
administered were adopted by us when we copied the system .... No one
doubts that interest on unsecured debts stops. 3
The reasons for this rule against interest are reflective of the basic
principles of bankruptcy, that is, to provide the debtor with financial re-
lief, an opportunity for a fresh start, and to treat all creditors fairly and
' 828 F.2d at 370.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 371.
5' One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to address the issue of postpetition interest was
Thomas v. Western Car Company, 149 U.S. 95 (1893). In its opinion, the Court described the pre-
Code rule on postpetition interest as follows:
As a general rule, after property of an insolvent passes into the hands of a receiver or of an
assignee in insolvency, interest is not allowed on the claims against the funds. The delay in
distribution is the act of law; it is a necessary incident to the settlement of the estate. We
see no reason in departing from this rule in a case like the present, where such a claim
would be paid out of moneys [sic] that fall short of paying the mortgage debt.
149 U.S. at 116-117 (citations omitted).
52 Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1910).
11 Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
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equitably in the process.5 This rule assures the debtor that, upon the
commencement of his case at bankruptcy, his obligations would no longer
accrue and would be measured at that moment so that the relief sought
could be effectuated. 5 The allowance of interest beyond the commence-
ment of the case was looked upon as a "penalty" imposed on creditors
subordinate to the claimant of interest. The courts stated that any delay in
the settlement of the bankruptcy case was an incident of the bankruptcy
proceeding and the allowance of interest, because of such delay, should not
benefit one creditor at the expense of others."'
The first two exceptions to this general rule prohibiting postpetition
interest appear to have been as well established as the rule itself and were
recognized by the Supreme Court along with the general prohibition.5
These two exceptions to the prohibition against postpetition interest were
limited to cases where the debtor proved to be solvent, and in cases where
the creditor held property of the debtor that produced income or dividends
during the bankruptcy proceedings.5 The equities that warranted these
two exceptions were founded on the idea that no other creditor would
suffer because of the allowance of postpetition interest. If the debtor was
solvent, all of his debts would be paid and "there would be no inequality
of distribution and other creditors [would] not suffer by allowing interest
on claims after bankruptcy."59
With respect to a creditor having an interest in income - producing
collateral, the allowance of postpetition interest would not result in a de-
pletion of the estate designated to satisfy the claims of the other creditors
In re Morrissey, 37 Bankr. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
5 Thomas v. Western Car Company, 149 U.S. 95, 116-117; Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946).
" Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946).
'7 The first two exceptions to the general prohibition against postpetition interest were also de-
rived from English law and recognized by the Supreme Court in City of New York v. Saper.
More than forty years ago Mr. Justice Holmes wrote for this Court that the rule stopping
interest at bankruptcy had then been followed for more than a century and a half. He said
the rule was not a matter of legislative command or statutory construction but, rather, a
fundamental principle of the English bankruptcy system which we copied.'
7 In England the practice was well established .... Two exceptions were recog-
nized: if the alleged "bankrupt" proved solvent, creditors received post-bankruptcy
interest before any surplus reverted to the debtor, and if securities held by a creditor
as collateral produced interest or dividends during bankruptcy such amounts were
applied to post-bankruptcy interest. These exceptions have been carried over into
our system.
336 U.S. 328, 330, 330 n.7 (1948) (citations omitted).
I8 d.
6' United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1959).
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because the assets of the estate available to these creditors would have
been identified at the commencement of the case.60 These two exceptions
appear to have evolved simultaneously with the general rule. The third
exception appears to have developed later.
The third exception, as it initially evolved in the courts, permitted
postpetition interest on a claim after the petition was filed if the value of
the collateral securing the creditor's claim exceeded the amount of the
principal and the interest due on the claim at the time the petition was
filed.61 On the several occasions that this third exception was recognized
by the Supreme Court, the Court was not called upon to consider the
applicability of this exception to nonconsensual liens.6 2 The exclusion of
nonconsensual liens from this exception did not occur until later, when the
question was considered in the lower federal courts.63 Such a limited view
of this exception has never been recognized by the Supreme Court.
The evolution and logic of the more restrictive third exception can
only be appreciated through an analysis of the four circuit court decisions
where the exception evolved in the context of consensual liens. As this
analysis will reveal, it is questionable whether the limited view of the
third exception can truly be deemed a part of the "well established" pre-
Code law on postpetition interest. First, unlike the general pre-Code pro-
hibition against postpetition interest and the first two exceptions, this lim-
ited third exception was never recognized by the Supreme Court as one of
the exceptions to the general prohibition, let alone as a well established
rule.6 Moreover, the equitable justifications for the limited third excep-
tion are not as compelling as in the case of the first two exceptions.t
Thus, it cannot be relied on with certainty that this limited third excep-
60 Id.
61
Simple interest on secured claims accruing after the petition was filed was denied unless
the security was worth more than the sum of principal and interest due.... But where an
estate was ample to pay all creditors and to pay interest even after the petition was filed,
equitable considerations were invoked to permit payment of this additional interest to the
secured creditor rather than to the debtor.
Vanston Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164 (1946) (citations omitted).
02 See Vanston Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339
(1910); Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1908).
13 See generally cases cited in note 28.
" In its decision to deny the third exception to a secured tax claimant, the First Circuit in
Boston & Maine noted that: "The Supreme Court has never ruled on the applicability of the third
exception, granting postpetition interest when there is sufficient secured collateral, to tax liens." 719
F.2d at 497.
05 See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5
Limits of Postpetition Interest
tion was the well established pre-Code rule codified by Congress under
Section 506(b), as suggested by the court in Ron Pair Enterprises.66
It was suggested in the pre-Code circuit court cases that the Supreme
Court had prohibited the allowance of any postpetition interest on "all"
tax claims in City of New York v. Saper.67 However, these courts ap-
peared to have been reading this decision by the Court out of context. In
Saper, the Supreme Court was considering whether tax claims had been
classified so as to enjoy a "highly preferred" status over all other debts
(under the Bankruptcy Act) that would allow postpetition interest on all
tax claims in exception to the general prohibition against postpetition in-
terest on debts. The Court held that, as a result of the 1926 and 1938
amendments to the Act, Congress had "assimilated taxes to other debts for
all purposes, including the denial of post-bankruptcy interest."68 Saper
did not involve a question concerning whether an over-secured tax claim
was entitled to postpetition interest pursuant to the acknowledged excep-
tions to the general prohibition.69 The Court in Saper was only address-
ing the question of whether all tax claims, regardless of the secured status
of the tax claim, were excepted from the general rule because of a special
preferred status under the Bankruptcy Act.
In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to determine
whether the over-secured tax claim was entitled to postpetition interest
under the third exception, the circuit courts argued that bankruptcy equi-
ties justified such an exclusion. In United States v. Harrington," the
Fourth Circuit began its consideration of the equities justifying the disal-
lowance of postpetition interest on a tax claim by looking at the principles
behind the "two clearly established exceptions to the rule that interest on
both secured and unsecured claims stops with the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy."" The court noted that with the first two exceptions al-
lowing postpetition interest in cases where the debtor is solvent or where
06 828 F.2d at 371.
17 In re Kerber Packing Co., 276 F.2d at 247-248; United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d at 684;
United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d at 131; United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d at 721.
336 U.S. at 337.
65 In considering the question of whether the unsecured tax claim was entitled to postpetition
interest, the Court in Saper only considered the permissibility of such interest under the first two
exceptions of the general rule prohibiting postpetition interest. The Court did not consider whether
the third exception, which addressed over-secured claims, applied to a secured tax claim. See In re
Ross Nursing Home, 2 Bankr. 496, 499-500 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) and Boston & Maine, 719 F.2d
at 496, for an accurate discussion of the issues considered by the Court in Saper.
70 269 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1959).
71 Id. at 722.
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the creditor holds the debtor's income producing property as collateral, the
allowance of postpetition interest would not adversely affect the interests
of other creditors. With the first exception, a "surplus is left after all
claims have been paid" and the creditors claiming interest may look to the
surplus.72 In the second exception, there would be no depletion of the
bankruptcy estate to the detriment of other creditors because the interest
would not be derived from assets that would have gone to the other credi-
tors, that is, all prepetition assets. 3 Thus, with both exceptions, the
postpetition interest was allowed because it would not be derived from
assets that would normally go to the remaining creditors.
The court noted that the equities warranting the exception to the
general rule in the first two exceptions were not present in the third ex-
ception, allowing postpetition interest on over-secured claims. In such a
case, the court acknowledged that:
If interest is allowed a secured creditor during the bankruptcy proceeding,
even though the security is sufficient, payment must come from assets which
would normally go to the remaining creditors. Delay in the termination of
the bankruptcy proceedings would diminish the shares of general creditors
through no fault of theirs.""
However, the court justified the exception in cases of consensual liens
versus nonconsensual liens by noting that the nonconsensual lien is usu-
ally against all of the debtor's assets and not a specific asset, as in the case
of the consensual lien. Accordingly, the allowance of postpetition interest
in the case of nonconsensual liens would be of greater damage to the in-
terest of the remaining creditors in that it could reach the entire estate. 5
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Harrington suggests some uncer-
tainty on the part of the court about the status of the third exception to
the general rule as well as the equities that would support the exception.
As noted by the court in its discussion, the first and second exceptions
were "the two clearly established exceptions" to the general prohibition
against postpetition interest.76 Moreover, the third exception did not pos-
sess the same equitable characteristics that justified these two exceptions.
The allowance of interest under the third exception, unlike the first two
"2 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
73 Id.
71 269 F.2d at 723.
75 Id.
" Id. at 723 n.6.
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exceptions, would result in a depletion of assets that would have been
distributed to the remaining creditors.
Furthermore, the distinction between consensual liens as being "spe-
cific" and nonconsensual liens as being "general" is not supportable in all
cases. First, consensual liens can be as all encompassing as nonconsensual
liens. That is, a creditor can require that a debt be secured by all of the
debtor's assets, or the impact of a floating lien against all of a debtor's
after-acquired property under a consensual lien could result in a large
percentage of the bankruptcy estate being deemed available for the pay-
ment of accruing interest, thus diminishing the available assets to the
other creditors. Similarly, not all nonconsensual liens are general liens
against all of the debtor's property. Some statutory liens are granted
against a specific property type such as a typical mechanic's lien. For ex-
ample, a mechanic's lien or construction lien is usually granted in favor of
the creditor who provides labor or supplies for improvements to the
debtor's property. These liens are usually limited to the real property or
personal property on which the construction project or improvement is
made by the laborer or supplier of the materials." Accordingly, this type
of nonconsensual lien may be far more specific and less expansive than
some consensual liens. Similarly, tax liens do not always cover all of the
debtor's assets, they may be limited to the property of the debtor on which
the taxes are unpaid, as was the case in Boston & Maine.7 8
The other justification offered by the court in Harrington, and by
the other courts that followed it, was that in the case of a consensual lien
the creditor has extended credit in reliance that a particular security was
given as collateral to secure both the principal and the interest of the debt
until payment, and that the contract should not be abrogated by bank-
ruptcy. 9 It had also been noted that with tax claims the payment of inter-
est is not contemplated in the payment of taxes at the beginning of a tax
year, and the imposition of interest on taxes is an enforcement device and
penalty that works against the remaining creditors rather than the
debtor.80 These types of distinctions do not seem to be significant enough
to justify the allowance of postpetition interest on consensual liens and not
11 T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN, F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL,
9.02[21[b] (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1985). For a discussion of the various types of specific statu-
tory liens, see 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, § 26.03 (Mathew Bender, 1986).
78 719 F.2d at 497 n.1.
'8 719 F.2d at 497; In re Kerber Packing Co., 276 F.2d at 247; United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d
at 131; United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d at 724.
80 719 F.2d at 497.
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on nonconsensual liens. Although they are distinctions between the two
classes of liens, consensual versus nonconsensual, they do not have any
bearing on the equitable concerns of the first two exceptions; that is
whether the allowance of postpetition interest in favor of one creditor is
granted at the expense of others. As noted above, the allowance of postpe-
tition interest to any over-secured creditor, whether consensual or noncon-
sensual in nature, will always deplete the assets of the estate at the ex-
pense of the remaining creditors. The fact that interest payments are
contemplated in a consensual lien does not lessen the impact of the accrual
of postpetition interest in favor of one creditor against the other creditors.
In either case, the allowance of postpetition interest will deplete assets
that could have gone to the remaining creditors.
The third exception also runs afoul of the basic foundations of bank-
ruptcy law in that it absolutely excludes all over-secured nonconsensual
claims from accruing postpetition interest without any consideration of the
equities in a case. It is more in the spirit of bankruptcy to consider the
permissibility of postpetition interest on all over-secured claims on a case-
by-case basis. In considering the limitations of postpetition interest, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Boston and Maine Corporation
stated that:
These exceptions are not rigid doctrinal categories. Rather, they are flexible
guidelines which have been developed by the courts in the exercise of their
equitable powers in insolvency proceedings. The reorganization court must
consider whether to grant postpetition interest, not as an abstract matter,
but in light of the nature of each claim and the equities of the case before it.
At all times the reorganization court must be guided by the basic equitable
principle announced in Vanston:
It is manifest that the touchstone of each decision on allowance of
interest in bankruptcy, receivership and reorganization has been a
balance of equities between creditor and creditor or between creditors
and the debtor.81
Based on the foregoing, it can be argued that the pre-Code rule limit-
ing postpetition interest to over-secured consensual liens was not a "well
established" pre-Code law on postpetition interest. This conclusion is
based on the fact that the logic supporting the distinctions between con-
sensual and nonconsensual liens was flawed and very disputable. The rule
81 Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
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did not embody the equitable principles of the first two exceptions to the
general pre-Code rule prohibiting postpetition interest; exceptions that
were as "well established" as the general pre-Code prohibition against
postpetition interest and were recognized by the Supreme Court. More-
over, the Code is designed to encourage a more equitable approach to
bankruptcy. Section 502(j) of the Code 2 provides that if a claim has been
allowed or disallowed it may be reconsidered for cause and allowed or
disallowed based on the equities of the case.83
IV. CONCLUSION
The objective of this article has been to analyze the current debate
over the interpretation of Section 506(b) of the Code. That is, does the
allowance of postpetition interest to over-secured creditors under Section
506(b) include all over-secured claims or only those that are consensual in
nature? The Sixth Circuit, in Ron Pair Enterprises, has held that be-
cause the language of this provision is ambiguous, and there is nothing in
the legislative history which specifically addresses the question of postpeti-
tion interest, Congress must have intended to codify the pre-Code rule
that limited the allowance of postpetition interest to over-secured liens
that were "consensual in nature." The Fourth Circuit, in Best Repair,
found the language of Section 506(b) not to be so ambiguous that it could
not be read to allow postpetition interest on all claims, secured by consen-
sual liens or nonconsensual liens.
The better interpretation of Section 506(b) is that it permits postpeti-
tion interest on all over-secured claims. This conclusion is based on sev-
eral of the points discussed above, including the fact that the plain lan-
guage of the provision does not specifically limit the allowance of
postpetition interest to consensual liens. In addition, the grammatical
structure of the provision supports the view that the allowance of postpeti-
tion interest under Section 506(b) is unqualified. Moreover, the lack of
legislative history on the question of postpetition interest should not be
used as an excuse to ignore the plain language of the statute, and to find
meaning outside of Section 506(b), in a pre-Code rule that is logically
flawed. When the Sixth Circuit relied on the pre-Code law to interpret
82 11 U.S.C. Section 502(j) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
83 A claim for postpetition interest may be objected to by the trustee or the debtor-in-possession.
11 U.S.C. §§ 704(5), 1106(a), 1302(b)(1) and 1107(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Once an objection
has been made, the court has to determine whether to allow or disallow the claim based on the
equities of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), (j) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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Section 506(b) in Ron Pair Enterprises, it was looking to a rule that was
based on a weak distinction between consensual and nonconsensual liens
that did not justify an absolute prohibition against the allowance of
postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens. This distinction is particu-
larly true in cases where nonconsensual liens are not all encompassing
and are limited to liens against specific property of the debtor, such as
mechanic's and artisan liens, as well as tax liens that are limited to prop-
erty on which a tax obligation is outstanding.
To interpret Section 506(b) as absolutely prohibiting postpetition in-
terest on nonconsensual liens, without any opportunity to consider the
facts in a given case, is contrary to the equitable principles of bankruptcy
law. Bankruptcy law provides for the consideration of each claim on its
merits and for a balancing of equities between the debtor and the debtor's
many creditors. Accordingly, Section 506(b) should simply be interpreted
as it was written by Congress. That is, consideration should be given to
postpetition interest on all over-secured claims, and the equities of a case
should determine what is fair in bankruptcy.
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